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Abstract 
 
This paper intends to combine two fields in the economic literature by examining empirically 
the FDI pattern –horizontal versus vertical– within the European Union and the relevance of 
trade integration as a potential determinant of investment flows over the period 1995-2009. 
We capture trade integration by estimating the magnitude and evolution of the home bias or 
border effect rather than by using other indicators such as the openness rate or the existence of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers. We find that, for the particular case of the EU, it is not possible 
to strictly discriminate between horizontal or vertical FDI. The market-seeking strategy 
appears to be more important than factor-proportion related motivations; however, the robust 
relationship of complementarity between trade integration and FDI provides at least one 
argument in support of vertical FDI and suggests that the vertical model cannot be dismissed 
entirely. 
JEL-Code: F100, F140, F150, F210. 
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1. Introduction. 
Trade and investment flows among countries have experienced a remarkable expansion 
over the first decade of the 21st century. A favourable economic climate during the first 
part of the decade alongside with a widespread trend among firms towards the 
geographical reorganization of production are some of the reasons underlying this 
behaviour. 
Trade in goods and services grew from US$ 16 trillion in 2000 to over US$ 37 trillion in 
2010. The ratio world trade to GDP increased in 10 percentage points (from 49% in 2000 
to 59% in 2010) during the first decade of the 21st century (UNCTAD, 2010a, 2011a). The 
global stock of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) mounted from US$ 7.5 trillion in 
2000 to US$ 19 trillion in 2010, its share in world GDP rising from 23% in 2000 to over 
31% in 20101.  
To what extent are these increases in trade and FDI linked? The answer to this question 
is not straightforward. If trade and FDI are alternative ways whereby multinational firms 
(MNEs) serve foreign markets, the expected correlation between trade and FDI will be 
negative. If, instead, the majority of MNEs fragment production and locate the various 
stages in different countries seeking cost reductions, FDI and trade will display a positive 
association. Ultimately, the connection between trade and FDI flows will be heavily 
contingent on the kind of operational model adopted by MNEs.  
The empirical evidence available on this issue is still not conclusive, since different pieces 
of research have found links between trade and FDI of either sign.  
This paper intends to contribute to this debate by analysing this issue for the particular 
case of the European Union. More specifically, the aim of this paper is twofold, first to find 
the FDI model that better describes the pattern of foreign investment within the EU and, 
secondly, to study specifically the nexus between commercial integration and FDI. To this 
end, we have used an alternative measure, the evolution of the home bias, to capture 
commercial integration within the EU. 
In order to pursue these goals, we exploit the information contained in an unbalanced 
panel comprising data for 19 EU economies by means of a gravity model with bilateral 
country-level data over the period 1995-2009.  
1 The Great Recession, obviously, has affected trade and FDI flows negatively. After a slowdown in 2008, the volume 
of world trade dropped by over 13% in 2009, the greatest decline since World War II. World merchandise trade, 
however, increased 14% in 2010. FDI flows fell 15% in 2008, 37% in 2009 and increased only by a modest 5% in 2010 
(UNCTAD, 2010b, 2011b). 
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In our view, the European Union provides a very interesting sample for the purpose of 
this investigation. The European countries encompass a highly integrated area, also 
characterized by a large increase of trade and investment flows in the first years of the 
21st century. European trade (imports + exports) in value terms grew 112% along the last 
decade, reaching a maximum of 11.7 trillion dollars in 2008. EU-19 FDI inflows, in turn, 
almost tripled from 2004 to 2007, reaching a maximum of 825.3 billion dollars2. 
Furthermore, the EU generates a relatively large share of world trade and FDI, around 
40%. 
Our methodological approach is novel in two different ways. First, we circumscribe our 
study to the analysis of intra-European FDI and trade flows since data available show that 
the majority of FDI and trade within the EU come from other EU economies. In effect, FDI 
with origin and destination within the EU accounted for 66% of the total inflows; in turn, 
64% of total EU exports moved within the EU-19, while for imports the percentage was 
about 60% on average over 1995-2009. Thus, using intra-European data will allow us to 
draw an accurate picture regarding the idiosyncrasy of the FDI-trade nexus within the EU.  
Second, and following Balta and Delgado (2009), we employ a relatively original measure 
for trade integration: the evolution of the home bias3. In order to capture commercial 
integration, studies have traditionally used variables such as the openness rate or the 
evolution of tariffs or dummies which reflect the fact of a country pertaining to a trade 
zone. However, the use of tariffs in our study is not possible as the EU is a customs union. 
Moreover, dummies capture the fact of some countries belonging to a trade agreement 
but they do not provide information on the members’ performance within that framework. 
In our view, the use of the home bias may help reflect more accurately the de facto 
effectiveness and success of the commercial integration phenomena in general, and of 
the EU as a highly integrated area in particular.  
Home biases may be employed within both a static and a dynamic approach. A home 
bias close to zero in a given moment of time suggests an almost perfect commercial 
integration. The evolution over time of the home bias, in turn, informs about the changes 
in the degree of commercial integration. An observed reduction in the home bias 
evidences a higher level of commercial integration. Notwithstanding these ideas, we have 
2 Again, the Great Recession had a negative impact on these figures. During 2008 and 2009, European trade 
experienced a 20% decline. EU 19 investment flows fell by 37% in 2008 and by an additional 32% in 2009. 
3 The home bias is the effect whereby consumers prefer domestic to foreign goods of similar characteristics. Its 
presence, in even highly integrated areas, has been regarded as one of the six major puzzles in the international 
economics (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001). A substantial number of studies has measured this phenomenon and 
highlighted its importance; for further discussion see Martinez et al. (2012b). 
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also employed the openness rate in our empirical analysis, thus carrying out a 
straightforward robustness test of the appropriateness of the home bias. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a brief review 
of the empirical and theoretical literature. Section 3 describes the data and offers a 
descriptive analysis. Section 4 explains our conceptual framework and the empirical 
specifications considered in this paper. We report our results in section 5. In the last 
section of the paper we conclude with policy implications and possible extensions for 
future work. 
2. A brief review of the literature.   
The choice of one or more appropriate locations for their plants abroad is a fundamental 
issue for MNEs. Usually, MNEs pursue different goals - often linked to their particular 
business model – when making these strategic decisions, and can be classified in distinct 
categories accordingly. Some of the first theoretical contributions which tackled this topic 
can be traced back to the 70s and early 80s (Caves, 1971; Dunning, 1973; Hymer, 1976; 
Buckley and Casson, 1976). Dunning classified the motivations driving foreign investment 
placements in four types, in a well-known taxonomy: strategic asset seeking, resource 
seeking, market seeking, and efficiency seeking.  
The literature in the 80s and 90s, in an intuitively appealing classification, suggested that 
FDI activities could follow horizontal or vertical models. Horizontal firms choose to locate 
their plants in specific countries or regions with the purpose of serving those markets, and 
hence produce the same good (or a slightly different version of it) in each country or 
region4. These are known as proximity-concentration models (Brainard, 1997; Helpman 
et al, 2004; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Neary, 2009). Vertical firms, instead, try to minimize 
production costs by separating the different stages of production and placing them at the 
most favorable locations in terms of resource endowments5. These are known as factor-
proportion models. (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Bergstrand, 1989; 
Brainard, 1997).  
The sign of the correlation between trade and FDI for each country or region will depend 
upon the type of model adopted by the majority of firms operating in it.  By and large, the 
setup adopted by horizontal firms may be considered as an alternative to exports; 
therefore, the FDI flows associated to these firms usually behave as a substitutive of 
4 Thus, these firms maximize proximity to customers. Usually (but not necessarily) they could also be able to profit from 
scale economies. In many occasions they will confront a tradeoff between proximity to customers and concentration of 
production intended to exploit scale economies. 
5 Decisions in this regard will be driven by the availability and costs of inputs at each potential site. 
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trade. Vertical MNEs, in turn, bring about trade flows among the different stages of the 
value chain, thus being complementary with trade.  
The distinction between horizontal and vertical firms is not always straightforward, 
though, since both types of models may coexist. At the end of the 90s, Markusen and 
Venables (1998), Carr et al (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002) designed the so 
called Knowledge-Capital model, which combined horizontal and vertical features. This 
model is based on three key assumptions (Carr et al., 2001): a) innovation and production 
activities can be undertaken at different venues; b) R+D activities are intensive in skilled 
labor; c) their outcomes can be incorporated into production at a low cost. In this setting, 
firms will behave as vertical MNEs when placing R+D and production in separated 
venues, according to factor costs, and as horizontal companies when locating production 
close to the markets intended to be served.   
Other approaches, often coming from the field of the New Economic Geography, have 
explored alternative factors driving firms’ decisions6. Especially pertinent for the purpose 
of this paper is the contribution of Head and Mayer (2004), which stressed market 
potential, understood as the set of customers that can be accessed from a particular 
venue, as an important determinant for investment location.  
The sign of the connection between trade and FDI has also been addressed empirically. 
Some studies have found a substitution relationship between trade and FDI (Mundell, 
1957, Graham, 1996; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004). Other contributions, instead, 
document that FDI and trade behave as complements rather than substitutes 
(Pfaffermayer, 1996; Brainard, 1997; Brenton et al, 1999; Balasubramanyam et al, 2002; 
Egger and Pfaffermayer, 2004a, 2004b; Alguacil et al, 2008; Neary, 2009; Martinez et al, 
2012a). Furthermore, other papers (Goldberg and Klein, 1999; Blonigen, 2001, Head and 
Ries, 2001, Swenson, 2004; Turkcan, 2007; Fillat-Castejón et al, 2008), have found both 
types of relationship between trade and FDI, suggesting that trade and FDI perform as 
complements when using country level data whereas, depending on the particular 
industry where they operate, the relationship can be positive or negative. In terms of the 
empirical evidence available, therefore, the literature has not reached a consensus yet 
on the sign of the connection between trade and FDI. 
3. Descriptive analysis of the data.  
This section will provide a first characterization of the data employed in our empirical 
analysis. Table 1 displays the proportion of total EU-19 trade and FDI flows which takes 
6 For an excellent review of FDI determinants see Blonigen (2005). 
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place within the EU economies. It is apparent from the Table that the own EU market is 
key for the EU-19 commercial and FDI activity. Around 64% of EU exports and 60% of 
EU imports have their destination or origin in other European countries. On average, also 
about 62% of European inward FDI flows come from other EU economies. Above and 
beyond these figures, the evolution of trade shows a very stable pattern up to 2005, 
ranging around 65% and 62% of the total for exports and imports, respectively. In 2005, 
though, the European interdependency regarding trade declined by 3 percentage points 
and finally, in 2009, it diminished notably –7% and 5% for exports and imports, 
respectively–. 
In turn, the importance of EU countries when acting as hosts of European FDI exhibits an 
important increase from 1995 –when they account for 44% of total EU inward FDI– to 
2005 – when 80% of inward FDI came from other European economies–. During the last 
years of the period the trend changes and intra-European FDI suffers a downturn, with 
only 53% of total FDI flows coming from other European countries. 
 
Table 1. Intra-European participation in total EU-19 trade and FDI 
 Exports Imports Trade Inward FDI 
1995 65.096 63.405 64.268 44.570 
1996 64.292 63.002 63.661 52.145 
1997 63.992 62.527 63.276 55.912 
1998 65.496 63.252 64.389 52.346 
1999 66.834 63.283 65.066 61.815 
2000 65.438 60.401 62.906 76.125 
2001 65.595 61.345 63.474 79.723 
2002 65.223 62.675 63.967 78.891 
2003 65.816 62.903 64.373 74.173 
2004 65.874 62.107 63.997 80.482 
2005 65.198 60.257 62.709 80.057 
2006 62.217 57.058 59.604 72.690 
2007 62.306 58.227 60.251 67.504 
2008 62.007 56.907 59.424 62.610 
2009 55.389 51.606 53.496 53.917 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: Figures denote the percentage of EU-19 total exports, imports and inward FDI flows that take place 
among the EU-19 countries. 
 
On a priori grounds it is not clear to what extent the fluctuations in trade and FDI flows 
are interrelated. In this sense, Figure 1 displays a scatter plot of inward FDI flows 
(measured in natural logarithms) against the intra-European Openness rate. Each point 
accounts for the pair inward FDI–Openness rate for a country in a certain year. The Figure 
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suggests a positive correlation between both variables, but this is very reliant upon the 
inclusion of Belgium and Luxembourg in the Figure (points for Benelux are located inside 
the square at the upper right corner); moreover, it is easy to identify another group of 
outliers (inside the circle), corresponding in this case to Ireland in 1995, 1996 and 1997. 
The rest of dots do not appear to follow a definite pattern: the trend line would be 
horizontal if Benelux was removed from the sample. The connection between trade and 
FDI within Europe, thus, is not straightforward. 
 
Figure 1. FDI-Openness relationship 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Data used in this study come mainly from the OECD. The International Direct Investment 
database provides data on bilateral foreign direct investment. FDI data is documented on 
an aggregate basis and measured in current US dollars. Data on bilateral exports, 
disaggregated by industries, are computed by the OECD in its Structural Analysis 
database (STAN). The GDPs in real terms and US dollars are taken from the OECD 
National Accounts Dataset. The FDI and Exports series have been deflated using the 
GDPs deflators included in the National Accounts Dataset. Data provided by the Centre 
d´Etudes Prospectives et d´Informations Internationals (CEPII) is employed to account 
for other variables included in our analysis, such as adjacency, common language and 
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bilateral distances. Bilateral geodesic distances are calculated following the great circle 
formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities/agglomerations 
(in terms of population) in each country.  
Relative Factor Endowments ratios (RFE) have been constructed using data on skilled7 
and total employment from the Yearbook of Labour Statistics published by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). Finally, the Corruption Perception Index 
elaborated by Transparency International is included in the specifications as an 
institutional control variable. This index ranks from 0 (high perception of corruption) to 10 
(low corruption).  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the study. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
FDI Inflowsij 2982 1787.795 6409.471 0.000 132651 
Ln (GDPi) 4590 12.854 1.034 10.969 14.845 
Ln (Distanceij) 4590 6.980 0.640 4.952 8.121 
Ln (RFEij) 4590 -0.003 0.135 -0.556 0.440 
Ln (GDPi+GDPj) 4590 13.783 0.831 11.817 15.405 
CPIj 4505 6.911 1.909 2.990 10.000 
Ln (EU Openness) 4590 3.516 0.148 3.309 3.809 
Ln (Opennessi) 4556 3.613 0.548 2.228 5.160 
Exportsij 119232 1612.938 2.59e+04 0.000 2.10e+06 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: All variables in real terms. Bilateral FDI inflows and Exports are in levels (millions 2005US$). 
 
4. Home bias estimation and empirical specification for FDI. 
As stated above, the objectives of the paper are to investigate the sign of the relationship 
between trade and FDI flows within the EU by using the evolution of the home bias as an 
alternative measure of commercial integration, and to analyse the FDI pattern for the 
countries in our sample. Next, we shall present the results obtained when estimating the 
home bias and afterwards we shall describe the analysis pursued in order to understand 
the FDI pattern within the EU, employing as one of the key variables precisely the home 
bias computed before.   
 
 
7 Skilled employment is defined as the sum of occupational categories 1 (legislators, senior officials and managers), 2 
(professionals) and 3 (technicians and associate professionals) from the ISCO-88 classification. 
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4.1. Estimation of the Home Bias for the European Union (EU-19). 
Different variables, such as the openness rate or the evolution in tariffs, have been used 
by the literature to measure commercial integration. Some contributions suggest that the 
performance of the home bias can be used as a measure of trade openness (Balta and 
Delgado, 2009). We have chosen to employ this last indicator since it may capture other 
dimensions (informal barriers, preferences) that ultimately determine commercial 
integration, and which are not included in alternative measures. In effect, the home bias 
measures the difference between the external and the internal (i.e. domestically oriented) 
trade of each country, thus capturing all factors which affect consumers’ decisions in favor 
of domestic good and services as opposed to those produced in other countries.  
The home bias has received a remarkable deal of attention in the literature. The path 
breaking contribution of McCallum (1995), which used a gravity model as his framework 
of analysis and found a substantial degree of home bias in the Canadian-USA trade, was 
followed by other pieces of research covering OCDE countries (Wei, 1996), the EU 
(Nitsch, 2000; Chen, 2004; Qian, 2007; Martinez et al. 2012b) and regions (Combes et 
al., 2005; Wolf, 2009; Llano et al., 20011). 
In its simplest form (Tinbergen, 1962), the gravity equation states that the volume of trade 
between any two countries is positively correlated with the economic size of the exporter 
and importer countries and negatively associated with the distance between them. 
Further extensions have introduced natural or artificial trade resistances (Anderson, 
1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). 
According to Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), the gravity equation for trade is 
specified as follows: 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤 � 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�1−𝜎𝜎          (1) 
 
where xij measures exports from the exporter i country to the importer j country in year   t. 
yit and yjt are the gross domestic product of the exporter and importer countries. ytw is the 
world GDP. tij stands for the bilateral trade barrier between country i and country j. Price 
indices Pit and Pjt are, in the terminology of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), 
“multilateral resistance” variables since they depend on all bilateral barriers or resistances 
(tij).  
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Thus, the gravity equation for trade to be estimated is as follows: 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� +  + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖) + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (2) 
 
where: Xijkt are the k-sector bilateral exports from country i to country j in year t. yit and yjt 
are the GDPs of countries i and j, respectively. Distij stands for the bilateral trade barrier 
between country i and country j (the bilateral distance) and Dij captures different 
characteristics of the exporter and importer countries such as sharing a common 
language or land border, being an island or being landlocked. Homet is a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 for intra-national trade and 0 otherwise. Additionally, the model 
includes origin and destination (ηi, ηj) as well as industry and time (ηk, ηt) fixed effects in 
order to account for the unobserved price indices or “multilateral resistance” mentioned 
by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)8. εijkt refers to the error term. 
We have estimated the border effect by means of a gravity equation employing data on 
bilateral trade for 23 sectors of activity9 among 19 European countries10 over the period 
1995 to 2009. We employ a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood model (PPML), 
proposed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), in order to overcome the disadvantages 
of a log-linear specification of the gravity model. These authors showed that, in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity in the error term, the parameters of log-linearized models 
estimated by OLS lead to biased estimations of the true elasticities. In addition, log-
linearization is incompatible with the existence of zeros in the dependent variable. The 
PPML method estimates the parameters by entering the dependent variable in levels 
while the independent ones are expressed in natural logarithms, thus providing a natural 
way to deal with zeros in the data11.  
On an a priori basis, bilateral exports from country i to country j are supposed to show a 
positive correlation with the economic sizes of both countries. Sharing special 
characteristics such as language or a common land border reduce transaction costs and 
8 Since the multilateral resistance terms are not observable, it is a common practice to use importer and exporter fixed 
effects to replace them; this approach, according to Feenstra (2002), provides consistent estimates and is easy to 
implement. 
9 See table A1 in the appendix. 
10 Austria, Benelux (Belgium-Luxembourg), Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
11 Panel dataset has 111,780 potential observations (23-sectors x 18-exporting countries x 18-importing countries x 
15-years) of which 4,463 are zero. 
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consequently foster bilateral trade. The bilateral distance between countries i and j should 
act as a barrier to trade and hence exhibit a negative sign.  
For the purpose of this paper, the key parameters in equation (2) are those corresponding 
to the dummy for Homet  since we can recover yearly border effects from their point 
estimates. The exponential of the coefficient of Homet, is the ratio of intra-national trade 
to international trade for a certain year, country or industry, after controlling for the size of 
GDP, distance, language, adjacency and others12 . Therefore, small point estimates for 
the home dummies indicate a low relative weight of intra-national trade and thus a large 
relevance of international trade for the correspondent countries, industries or years of the 
sample, and substantial trade integration (Qian, 2007; Balta and Delgado, 2009; Martinez 
et al, 2012b). If border effects diminish over time, it means that intra-national trade 
becomes less important relative to international trade and hence preference for 
domestically produced goods, as opposed to foreign ones, declines over the period 
considered, other things equal.  
We have estimated two types of Home Bias (HB). First, we compute the HB for the entire 
EU-19 sample over the years 1995-2009 in order to capture the size of the EU commercial 
integration as a whole. Second, we compute the HB for each country to help understand 
how individual HBs affect bilateral flows of FDI among EU countries. Table A2 in appendix 
reports the original estimations using different specifications of the gravity equation (2).  
As shown in Table A2, in all specifications, the basic gravity explanatory variables are 
highly significant and the coefficients have the expected signs. In order to compute the 
border effect from the estimations we take the exponential of the point estimate of the 
home variable13.  
Table 3 summarizes the evolution of the border effects obtained from the estimations 
reported in the appendix and for different model specifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
12 See, among others, McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1996), Wei (1996), Nitsch (2000), Wolf (2009), Chen (2004) and Liu 
et al. (2010) for further explanation. 
13 For example, to calculate the HB for 2009, we use the estimation at the fourth column and year 2009 
(Home2009=2.689); this figure means that, on average, a European country traded 14.7 times (exp2.689=14.71) more 
with itself than with another European partner. 
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Table 3. Evolution of the home bias 
Estimation Baseline Adjacency and Language dummies 
Island and 
Landlocked dummies 
Full model with 
time fixed effects 
1995 5.58 13.78 13.68 14.40 
1996 6.45 16.05 15.50 15.75 
1997 7.01 17.43 16.74 17.03 
1998 6.97 17.25 16.63 16.86 
1999 7.19 17.78 17.18 17.50 
2000 7.79 18.71 18.47 18.82 
2001 8.00 19.67 19.59 20.03 
2002 7.71 19.13 18.34 18.69 
2003 6.55 16.22 15.53 15.80 
2004 5.85 14.45 13.89 14.21 
2005 5.58 13.89 13.30 13.49 
2006 5.30 13.20 12.67 12.86 
2007 4.91 11.99 11.87 11.93 
2008 5.09 12.30 12.21 14.28 
2009 5.80 14.14 14.45 14.72 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: Estimated Border Effects are calculated as the exponential of the β-estimates for the Home variables 
in table A2 (expHomet). Columns are presented in the same order as in table A2. 
 
The first column exhibits the results from the standard gravity equation where the 
economic size of the exporter and importer countries and the distance between them are 
considered. Calculations reported in Column 2 include dummy variables for adjacency 
and language. The last two columns display results from equations that include other 
potentially important features for trade, as being an island or landlocked, either for the 
exporter and importer countries14. The average overall border effect shows a net increase 
of around 3% from 1995 to 2009 for the EU-19 countries. Point estimates for the border 
effects in column 1 show lower values than in the rest of columns; however, since this is 
a very simple model where some likely relevant variables are omitted, those coefficients 
may be biased. Once dummy variables are included and different fixed effects are 
considered, the border effects rise but display comparable values across specifications.  
A very similar pattern over time arises for the border effect estimates in all the 
specifications, suggesting three sub-periods. In the first one, 1995-2001, the values of 
the HB grow over time around 40%. A second sub-period, from 2002 to 2007, is 
characterised by a sharp decline in border effects, also close to 40%; finally, the border 
14 See Martinez et al. (2012b) for further discussion on the coefficients and their interpretation. 
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effect mounts again in the last two years of analysis, between 18% and 23%, this increase 
being especially important in 2009 when the border effect augments between 14% and 
19% from the previous year, depending on the specification considered. These results fit 
remarkably well the picture which arises from the descriptive analysis of the data.  
We have also computed the evolution of the border effect from a country point of view by 
estimating the country-specific evolution of the home bias over the period considered. 
Estimated border effects and intra-European openness rate15 for each country are 
presented in Figure 2. 
The results offer a different picture depending on the country but we can also observe 
common trends. In general terms, a clear decrease of the border effect in 15 out of the 
19 countries considered can be seen. When sub-periods are analyzed, twelve economies 
show an increase of the home bias until 2001-2002, followed by a sharp fall afterwards. 
Similarly, estimates show a rise of the border effect, for all countries, in 2009.  
The analysis by individual countries suggests that the Central and Eastern European 
economies (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) exhibit the highest values 
for the border effect, with Hungary ranking on the first position; these figures indicate, in 
turn, that exports from these countries to the rest of countries in the sample in 1995 were 
small relative to the domestic demand. The decline of the HB over time is remarkable, 
and can be traced back to the process of EU enlargement and the subsequent 
possibilities of accession to a larger market. Estimates for Slovakia and Poland at the end 
of the period, for example, are comparable to those of France, Italy or Spain. 
Benelux and the Netherlands exhibit the lowest levels of the home bias. Moreover, the 
border effect in these countries has decreased significantly along the period. Germany 
and the UK also display a large level of trade integration compared to the rest of the EU-
19. Some of the peripheral countries, such as Finland, Ireland, Greece and Portugal, 
make up another group of similar characteristics, with similar levels of the HB and with 
an evolution over time which ends up in a slightly higher border effect at the end of the 
period with respect to 1995. The remaining countries in the sample (Austria, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Spain and Sweden) show a clear downward trend in the HB, with Sweden 
and Denmark displaying higher home bias values within the sub-group. The openness 
rate shows a behavior which is almost perfectly the inverse of the home bias. 
 
15 Intra-European Openness Rate is computed as exports plus imports to/from the rest of the EU-19 divided by GDP. 
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Figure 2. Country specific home bias and intra-European openness rate 
Austria Belgium-Luxembourg Czech Republic Denmark Finland 
     
France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland 
     
Italy Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovakia 
     
Spain Sweden United Kingdom   
   
Source: own elaboration 
Notes: Solid lines account for the estimated border effect while the 
dotted ones represent the country’s intra-European Openness Rate. 
Left vertical axes are the reference for the openness rate (in 
percentage). Right vertical axes are the scale for the border effect. 
Data on exports, imports and GDP are from the OECD. Border Effects 
have been estimated by means of the gravity equation (2). 
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4.2. Gravity model for FDI. 
In this subsection we present the empirical specification employed to ascertain which kind 
of model reflects better the behaviour of FDI flows within EU-19. To discriminate among 
the different FDI models, the theoretical literature establishes that the main determinants 
underlying location choices can be summarized in the following: size and market potential 
in the home and host countries, the difference in resource endowments between the 
home and host countries, and the distance between both countries. In turn, the potential 
of the host market may be contingent on aspects such as the degree of macroeconomic 
stability and the quality of institutions. These ideas can be easily accommodated within 
the framework proposed by Kleinert and Toubal (2010); these authors design a FDI 
gravity model which allows to include additional variables such as the trade protection 
indexes (see Carr et al, 2001; and Braconier et al, 2005; as well). This paper employs 
this basic setup, but proposes a novel approach to build the trade indicators from the 
estimation of the home bias or border effect.  
Some papers have shown that the rationale behind the gravity equation for trade can also 
be employed to model the determinants of FDI (Eaton and Tamura, 1996; Graham, 1996; 
Brenton et al, 1999). Empirical studies that adapted the gravity equation for trade to FDI 
can be found, among others, in Brainard (1997), Markusen and Maskus (2002) and 
Bergstrand and Egger (2007). More in particular, Kleinert and Toubal (2010) provide the 
theoretical foundations for the application of the gravity equation to foreign affiliates’ 
sales16. This theoretical approach serves as a benchmark to develop a gravity equation 
that could be modified to test for horizontal and vertical FDI models. For the proximity-
concentration model –horizontal– the theoretical specification will be as follows: 
 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂1�(1−𝜎𝜎)(1−𝜀𝜀)𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (3) 
 
where fdiijt measures the aggregate FDI flows from country i to country j in year t. yit is the 
home country GDP in real terms, which proxies for its supply capacity, and yjt is the host 
country GDP in real terms, which accounts for its market potential. Distance costs, 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜂𝜂1, 
are an increasing function of geographical distance between i and j with 𝜏𝜏 being unit 
distance costs of the iceberg type and η1>0. 
16 Although this specification of the gravity model is intended to analyse sales of foreign affiliates, it also may be used 
to account for FDI (See Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). 
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The vertical model for FDI flows can be characterized as: 
 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝜇𝜇)�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑔𝑔2�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ �𝑓𝑓�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍 �𝑔𝑔1 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�⁄𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�⁄ �    (4) 
 
Where fdiijt measures again the aggregate FDI flows from country i to country j in year t. 
𝑔𝑔2�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ � is a function of the income ratio, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍  is a function of the distance costs, and 
𝑔𝑔1 �
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�⁄
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�⁄
� is a function of the relative factor endowment ratio between country i and 
country j. The labor shares are computed as the proportion of the home country skilled 
labor in total skilled labor of the two countries,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖�⁄ , and the share of the home 
country unskilled labor, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖�⁄ .   
Equations (3) and (4) provide the baseline specification and can be transformed into 
empirical models to be estimated as follows:  
 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2 ln�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽3 ln�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽4 ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) +  +𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (5) 
 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2 ln�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽3 ln�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽4 ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) +  + 𝛽𝛽5 ln�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (6) 
 
Equation (5) above corresponds to horizontal FDI models while equation (6) refers to 
vertical schemes.  fdiijt are the bilateral investment flows from country i to country j in year 
t. yit and yjt are the GDPs of countries i and j, respectively. Distij stands for the bilateral 
distance between home and host countries. The Home Biast is estimated by using a 
gravity model, as detailed above; its evolution over time reflects the degree of trade 
integration between the home and host country. RFEijt is the relative factor endowment 
ratio, defined as  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙�𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�⁄ � − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�⁄ � . CPIjt is the Corruption Perception 
Index from Transparency International and proxies for the degree of institutional 
environment. Additionally, the model includes origin, destination, and time (ηi, ηj, ηt) fixed 
effects. εijt refers to the error term. 
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With respect to the estimation methodology, we have used bilateral data from a panel of 
19 European countries for the period 1995-2009. Following Santos-Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) again, we have employed a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood model (PPML).  
5. Results. 
This section discusses the results obtained when trying to capture the impact of intra-
European trade integration on the bilateral FDI flows within the nineteen European 
countries, using the gravity model specifications discussed above. Figure 3 shows the 
correlation between the Home Bias and FDI inflows. More specifically, FDI for a reporting 
country accounts for the logarithm of the aggregate flows from the rest of the European 
countries in the sample. The figure suggests a negative relationship between FDI and the 
Home Bias. Thus, we may expect negative coefficients in the estimation of the gravity 
model for FDI. As we did in Figure 1, we have also identified the Benelux (right upper 
corner square) and Ireland in 1995, 1996 and 1997 (circle). It is apparent that, when using 
the Home Bias as an index of trade, the connection between commercial integration and 
FDI within Europe (see Figure 3) appears clearer and more definite than when the 
openness rate is employed as in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 3. FDI–Home Bias relationship 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 4 presents the estimation results from equations (5) and (6). The dependent 
variable is the real FDI inflows to country j from country i, being country j the reporting 
one. 
The first two columns of Table 4 present the simplest horizontal and vertical FDI models. 
Point estimates regarding home and host GDPs display positive and significant values in 
both columns. The structural models in Kleinert and Toubal (2010) suggest that for the 
case of the horizontal model, the coefficients on both GDP variables should be equal to 
one17. However, our results show that the restriction of both coefficients being equal to 
unity is rejected at the 1% level (see column 1). Furthermore, according to Kleinert and 
Toubal, the structural vertical model predicts a negative value for the home country GDP 
estimate, which, as it can be observed, is not supported by our estimations either. 
Regarding column 2, the structural vertical model also suggests that the variable market 
demand for goods (proxied by the sum of GDPs) should present an estimate equal to 
unity and the relative factor endowment ratio (RFE) should be positive18. In these two 
cases our empirical results present mixed evidence. While the sum of GDPs is negative 
and significant at the 10% level, the RFE ratio displays a positive and significant 
coefficient. In all cases, estimates regarding bilateral distance are in line with the 
theoretical models.  
Estimations reported in columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 include the home bias, thus providing 
information on the trade–FDI relationship. In column 3, we include the home bias variable 
for the overall EU-19, while in column 4 we consider the investor and recipient home bias 
variables separately. In both cases results show a negative and highly significant 
coefficients for these variables, suggesting that the higher the home bias of a particular 
country, the lower the FDI inflows it attracts. This result points out to a complementary 
pattern between European commercial integration and FDI.  
In order to test the robustness of these results columns 5 and 6 report the estimations 
when using the traditional openness variable. Whereas column 5 considers the intra-
European openness rate, column 6 introduces the home and host country openness rates 
individually. Results from using these variables indicate, as in the previous cases, a 
complementary relationship between intra-European trade and FDI. Moreover, results 
show a similar pattern to those obtained using the home bias variable proposed in this 
paper.  
17 See Kleinert and Toubal (2010) for further information. 
18 The intuition is that the more skilled labour abundant is the home country relative to the host country, the larger the 
bilateral FDI flows between them. 
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Another remarkable aspect that arises from the estimation is the impact of the economic 
crisis. In this sense, it is particularly interesting to test whether the FDI-Trade relationship 
has been affected by the financial and economic turbulences. We have addressed this 
issue by including an interaction term between the EU Home Bias and the time dummies 
for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 (column 7) Results show an overall complementary 
relationship between EU Home Bias and FDI (see column 3 and 7) however, column 7 
suggests that this complementary relationship has changed throughout the last years of 
the analysis. The coefficient for the interaction term in 2007 is negative and significant, 
whereas the point estimate for this variable in 2008 is not statistically significant; finally, it 
is positive and significant for 2009.   
Results so far do not enable us to discriminate fully between horizontal and vertical 
strategies in the pattern of Intra-European FDI; hence, it seems to be a more complex 
and less straightforward phenomenon, perhaps a combination of a horizontal and a 
vertical model. 
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Table 4: Home Bias-FDI nexus by means of the gravity equation 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
ln (Yi) 0.715 *** 1.086 *** 1.093 *** 0.852 *** 1.093 *** 1.396 *** 1.093 *** 
 (0.094)  (0.179)  (0.191)  (0.188)  (0.191)  (0.178)   (0.191)  
ln (Yj) 0.560 *** 0.880 *** 0.796 *** 0.620 *** 0.796 *** 1.259 *** 0.796 *** 
 (0.086)  (0.202)  (0.222)  (0.226)  (0.222)  (0.156)  (0.222)  
ln (Distij) -1.358 *** -1.347 *** -1.189 *** -0.804 *** -1.189 *** -0.631 *** -1.189 *** 
 (0.150)  (0.137)  (0.102)  (0.111)  (0.102)  (0.115)  (0.102)  
ln (Yi+Yj)   -0.722 * -0.810 ** 0.748 ** -0.810 ** -1.010 *** -0.810 ** 
   (0.371)  (0.378)  (0.361)  (0.380)  (0.327)  (0.378)  
RFEij   2.323 *** 1.123  0.506  1.123  1.300 * 1.123  
   (0.752)  (0.825)  (0.635)  (0.825)  (0.760)  (0.825)  
CPIj     0.296 *** 0.248 *** 0.296 *** 0.269 *** 0.296 *** 
     (0.066)  (0.069)  (0.066)  (0.058)  (0.066)  
IRELANDj     0.765 ** 0.551 * 0.765 ** 0.855 *** 0.765 ** 
     (0.381)  (0.298)  (0.381)  (0.244)  (0.381)  
CEEj     -1.288 *** -0.479 ** -1.288 *** -0.694 *** -1.288 *** 
     (0.193)  (0.218)  (0.193)  (0.163)  (0.193)  
EU HB     -3.359 ***       -1.336 *** 
     (1.013)        (0.164)  
Home Biasi       -0.373 ***       
       (0.079)        
Home Biasj       -0.298 ***       
       (0.103)        
EU OPEN         2.474 ***     
         (0.746)      
OPENi           0.712 ***   
           (0.226)    
OPENj           1.042 ***   
           (0.266)    
EU HB * 2007             -0.263 ** 
             (0.114)  
EU HB * 2008             -0.121  
             (0.082)  
EU HB * 2009             0.562 *** 
             (0.069)  
Observations 2982  2982  2952  2952  2952  2952  2952  
Test 
ln(Yi)=ln(Yj)=1 57.64 *** 1.45  2.74  2.96  2.74  4.97 * 2.74 
 
p-value 0.000  0.483  0.254  0.227  0.254  0.083  0.254  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the real bilateral FDI inflows to country 𝑗𝑗 from country 𝐷𝐷 (country j reporting 
country). Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*, **, *** denote significantly different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Home country, host 
country and time fixed effects are included in all the regressions. 
 
The next columns (3 to 7) show the results from estimations which include additional 
variables to test for the extended vertical model. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
of the host country is included in order to control for a safe investment environment. 
Dummy variables for Ireland and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) as 
recipients of FDI are included. The rationale behind the introduction of these dummy 
variables deal with the fact that Ireland has reduced its corporation tax from 28.5% in 
1999 to 12.5% in 2003 and afterwards, making the investment activity in that country 
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more profitable. In the case of the CEE countries, their particular idiosyncrasies and their 
relatively recent inclusion in the European Union may be relevant to attract FDI. Finally, 
commercial integration variables are considered to test the trade-FDI nexus. 
Once the model is augmented, the lack of conclusiveness remains, as shown in columns 
3 to 7. On the one hand, the sign and size of the home GDP and the goods market 
demand (sum of GDPs) do not match the predictions of the vertical theory. It is true that 
the coefficient for RFE displays the correct sign, positive, but the evidence in favour of 
the factor–proportion differentials argument is not robust enough, as the results are not 
statistically different from zero in all specifications -except for column 2-. On the other 
hand, although estimates for the home and host GDPs variable reject the hypothesis of 
unity in the horizontal model (column 1), the results emerging from the rest of the 
estimations cannot reject this hypothesis. As mentioned above, our results do not enable 
us to discriminate between horizontal and vertical models. Our results are in line with 
Braconier et al (2005) who find strong support for the knowledge capital hybrid model 
using data on foreign affiliate’s sales for 56 home and 85 host countries for 1986, 1990, 
1994 and 199819.  
CPI estimates show positive and significant values in all the specifications. Additionally 
point estimates across the specifications are very stable, ranging from 0.218 to 0.296. 
These results suggest the importance of having a corruption free environment when it 
comes to attract FDI flows. The dummy variable for Ireland is positive and significant, 
which might be due to the effect of a reduced corporate tax, ceteris paribus. Point 
estimates range from 0.551 to 1.119 and are significantly different from zero at the 5% 
and 1% levels.  
Instead, dummies for CEE countries are negative. This suggests that there are still some 
factors, such as the insufficient development of the institutional framework and the rule of 
law, the uncertainty regarding property rights and the lack of a developed financial sector, 
which jeopardize FDI inflows.  Finally, given the special characteristics of the Benelux 
and Ireland highlighted previously (see Figure 1), we have estimated the FDI models 
without these two countries, Table A3 in the appendix shows the outcome. Results 
obtained are similar and in line to those computed for the whole sample. 
 
 
19 Kleinert and Toubal (2010) however, suggest the prevalence of the horizontal model when analysing foreign affiliates’ 
sales using the same data than Braconier et al (2005).   
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6. Conclusions. 
The empirical analysis carried out and described in this paper states that commercial 
integration and FDI within the European Union display a relationship of complementarity. 
The novelty of our analysis is that this relationship is captured using the evolution of the 
home bias as the proxy for commercial integration. Results obtained regarding this 
variable, nonetheless, are indeed confirmed and reinforced when using more traditional 
indicators such as the openness rate. An interesting feature suggested by our empirical 
exercise is that this complementary relationship does not seem to carry over in the crisis 
years 2008 and 2009. Does it mean that this relationship has experienced a structural 
change or it is just a consequence of the dynamics propitiated by the crisis? This issue 
deserves further research, to be pursued in the next future.   
The results also point out that the FDI pattern within the European Union cannot be 
classified according to clear cut vertical or horizontal models. Instead, it seems that FDI 
flows follows a combination of both and therefore a hybrid model. While factor proportions 
appear not to be as relevant as the possibility of gaining market share –thus pointing to a 
horizontal model–, the complementarity relation between commercial integration and FDI 
suggest some kind of vertical motivations. 
Our findings support the idea that policies targeted to promote further consolidations of 
the European Single Market –removing informal trade barriers, enhancing market 
liberalization and reducing bureaucracy–, may have positive effects, not only regarding 
the commercial performance of the EU but also helping to intensify FDI flows among the 
European countries, and indirectly, stimulating economic growth. 
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Appendix. 
 
Table A1. Sectors of activity. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Mining and quarrying 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, leather and footwear 
Wood and cork 
Pulp paper, printing and publishing 
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 
Chemical excluding pharmaceuticals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Rubber and plastics 
Non-metallic products 
Basic metals 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Fabricated metal products 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c 
Office, accounting and computing machinery 
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 
Radio TV communication equipment 
Medical precision and optical instrument 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Shipbuilding 
Aircraft and spacecraft 
Railroad and transport equipment n.e.c 
Manufacturing n.e.c and recycling 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Table A2. Gravity equation for trade with yearly border effects 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Ln (Yi) 1.000 *** (0.064) 1.049  *** (0.082) 1.203  *** (0.070) 1.201 *** (0.064) 
Ln (Yj) 1.099 *** (0.061) 1.156  *** (0.072) 1.284  *** (0.075) 1.144 *** (0.083) 
Ln (Distij) -1.389 *** (0.017) -0.941  *** (0.021) -0.9360  *** (0.021) -0.971 *** (0.022) 
Adjacency    0.554  *** (0.033) 0.596  *** (0.032) 0.594 *** (0.034) 
Common Language    1.031  *** (0.039) 1.018  *** (0.039) 1.040 *** (0.040) 
Islandi     1.779 *** (0.212) -1.349 *** (0.168) 
Islandj     -2.597  *** (0.288) -0.530 ** (0.239) 
Landlockedi       2.598  *** (0.174) 0.476 ** (0.191) 
Landlockedj       -2.340  *** (0.269) -2.966 *** (0.311) 
Home 1995 1.720  *** (0.064) 2.623  *** (0.071) 2.626  *** (0.071) 2.667 *** (0.093) 
Home 1996 1.864  *** (0.058) 2.776  *** (0.066) 2.741  *** (0.066) 2.757 *** (0.068) 
Home 1997 1.947  *** (0.058) 2.858  *** (0.066) 2.818  *** (0.066) 2.835 *** (0.068) 
Home 1998 1.941  *** (0.060) 2.848  *** (0.067) 2.811  *** (0.067) 2.825 *** (0.069) 
Home 1999 1.973  *** (0.060) 2.878  *** (0.067) 2.844  *** (0.067) 2.862 *** (0.069) 
Home 2000 2.053  *** (0.060) 2.959  *** (0.067) 2.916  *** (0.067) 2.935 *** (0.069) 
Home 2001 2.079  *** (0.062) 2.979  *** (0.069) 2.975  *** (0.069) 2.997 *** (0.071) 
Home 2002 2.043  *** (0.062) 2.951  *** (0.069) 2.909  *** (0.069) 2.928 *** (0.070) 
Home 2003 1.879  *** (0.061) 2.786  *** (0.068) 2.743  *** (0.068) 2.760 *** (0.070) 
Home 2004 1.766  *** (0.063) 2.671  *** (0.069) 2.631  *** (0.069) 2.654 *** (0.071) 
Home 2005 1.719 *** (0.063) 2.631  *** (0.069) 2.588  *** (0.069) 2.602 *** (0.071) 
Home 2006 1.667 *** (0.064) 2.580  *** (0.071) 2.539  *** (0.070) 2.554 *** (0.072) 
Home 2007 1.592 *** (0.064) 2.484 *** (0.071) 2.474 *** (0.070) 2.479 *** (0.072) 
Home 2008 1.627 *** (0.078) 2.510 *** (0.083) 2.503 *** (0.082) 2.508 *** (0.084) 
Home 2009 1.758 *** (0.080) 2.649 *** (0.083) 2.664 *** (0.082) 2.689 *** (0.084) 
Observations 109,932   109,953   109,881   109,400   
R2 0.881  0.882  0.883  0.882  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is the real bilateral exports 
from country i to country j. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significant at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Industry fixed effects and year-specific exporter and importer fixed 
effects are included in all the regressions (Feenstra, 2002). The last column also includes time fixed effects. 
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Table A3: Home Bias-FDI nexus (without Benelux and Ireland) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
ln (Yi) 0.812 *** 1.357 *** 1.433 *** 1.250 *** 1.433 *** 1.546 *** 1.433 *** 
 (0.083)  (0.167)  (0.158)  (0.183)  (0.158)  (0.175)   (0.158)  
ln (Yj) 0.772 *** 1.273 *** 1.222 *** 1.177 *** 1.222 *** 1.206 *** 1.222 *** 
 (0.080)  (0.145)  (0.141)  (0.143)  (0.141)  (0.146)  (0.141)  
ln (Distij) -1.098 *** -1.087 *** -0.964 *** -0.885 *** -0.964 *** -0.914 *** -0.964 *** 
 (0.168)  (0.143)  (0.138)  (0.123)  (0.138)  (0.151)  (0.138)  
ln (Yi+Yj)   -1.153 *** -1.350 *** -1.448. *** -1.350 *** -1.400 *** -1.350 *** 
   (0.329)  (0.287)  (0.292)  (0.287)  (0.283)  (0.287)  
RFEij   2.737 *** 0.786  0.285  0.786  0.048  0.786  
   (0.841)  (0.957)  (0.732)  (0.957)  (0.968)  (0.957)  
CPIj     0.344 *** 0.275 *** 0.344 *** 0.327 *** 0.344 *** 
     (0.048)  (0.054)  (0.048)  (0.055)  (0.048)  
CEEj     -0.761 *** -0.590 ** -0.761 *** -0.787 *** -0.761 *** 
     (0.176)  (0.212)  (0.176)  (0.184)  (0.176)  
EU HB     -2.427 **       -0.999 *** 
     (1.209)        (0.194)  
Home Biasi       -0.289 ***       
       (0.081)        
Home Biasj       -0.078        
       (0.065)        
EU OPEN         1.788 **     
         (0.891)      
OPENi           0.469 **   
           (0.228)    
OPENj           0.164    
           (0.270)    
EU HB * 2007             -0.159  
             (0.131)  
EU HB * 2008             -0.102  
             (0.115)  
EU HB * 2009             0.415 *** 
             (0.084)  
Observations 2321  2321  2292  2292  2292  2292  2292  
Test 
ln(Yi)=ln(Yj)=1 13.28 *** 4.83 * 8.13 ** 1.99  8.13 ** 14.04 *** 8.13 
** 
p-value 0.001  0.090  0.017  0.370  0.017  0.001  0.017  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the real bilateral FDI inflows to country 𝑗𝑗 from country 𝐷𝐷 (country j 
reporting country). Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. Clustered robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significantly different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Home 
country, host country and time fixed effects are included in all the regressions. 
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